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Does Ethnicity Determine Support for 





Structural theories predict that the cues of social identity, particularly ethnicity, 
should exert a strong influence upon voting choices and party support in 
traditional agrarian societies, characterized by low levels of education and 
minimal access to the news media. To explore these issues, this study seeks to 
analyze the influence of ethno-linguistic and ethno-racial characteristics on 
identification with the governing party in a dozen African states, compared with 
other structural and attitudinal factors commonly used to explain patterns of 
partisanship in many countries. The study draws upon the first wave of the 
Afrobarometer, a cross-national representative survey of political and social 
values conducted in 1999-2001 in twelve nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, ranging 
from Botswana to Zimbabwe. 
 
We establish three main findings. (i) Even with social and attitudinal controls, 
ethnicity is a significant predictor of party support in most, although not all, 
African societies under comparison.  (ii) Yet the strength of this association 
varies cross-nationally, with the linkages strongest in societies divided by many 
languages, such as Namibia and South Africa, while playing an insignificant 
role in African countries where ethno-linguistic cleavages are more 
homogeneous, including Lesotho and Botswana. (iii) Moreover structural 
explanations are limited: evaluations of the policy performance of the party in 
government also influenced patterns of party support, even with prior social 
controls. The conclusion summarises the results and considers their broader 
implications for understanding the role of ethnic cleavages in elections within 
plural societies. 
 
One classic issue in electoral behaviour concerns the relative strength of social 
cleavages and political issues in structuring voter choice and party identification. 
Following the seminal structural theories of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), much of 
this literature has focused upon the cleavages of social class, religion, and 
centre-periphery that have long divided established democracies. Debate has 
centred on whether the strength of these social cues on electoral behaviour have 
weakened in post-industrial societies during recent decades, with commentators 
emphasising the process of partisan de-alignment and the rise of issue voting 
among more cognitively-skilled citizens (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; 
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Crewe and Denver, 1985; Franklin et al, 1992; Evans, 1999; Norris, 2003). An 
important related question, although one that has received less systematic 
attention, concerns the strength of social cleavages in traditional agrarian 
societies, and in particular whether ethnicity determines stable patterns of party 
support and electoral behaviour in these countries, analogous to the anchor of 
social class in industrialised nations. This question is most relevant for electoral 
democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, where ethnic ties based on kinship and 
family, language and dialect, tribal customs and local communities, as well as 
shared religious faiths, have long been regarded as playing a critical role in party 
politics (Horowitz, 1985; Salih and Markakis, 1998, Palmberg, 1999; Bekker, 
Dodds and Khosa, 2001; Daddieh and Fair, 2002). Structural theories predict 
that the cues of social identity, particularly ethnicity, should exert a strong 
influence upon voting choices and party support in traditional agrarian societies, 
characterised by low levels of education and minimal access to the news media. 
This phenomenon is important, not just for understanding the basis of electoral 
behaviour, but also because of its potential consequences for the process of 
democratisation. Horowitz (1985) argues that where ascribed ethnic loyalties are 
strong, they generate party systems reflecting rigid group boundaries: ‘Societies 
that are deeply riven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage – as in many Asian 
and African states – tend to throw up party systems that exacerbate ethnic 
conflict.’ (Horowitz 1985: 291).  Few commentators doubt that ethnicity exerts 
some influence upon party politics in Africa; the relevant question is how much 
influence can be attributed to ethnic cues when compared with other structural 
factors such as urbanisation, age and education, and compared with political 
attitudes, such as evaluations of government performance. 
 
To explore these issues, this study seeks to analyse the influence of ethno-
linguistic and ethno-racial characteristics on identification with the governing 
party in a dozen African states, compared with other structural and attitudinal 
factors commonly used to explain patterns of party support in many countries. 
The study draws upon the first wave of the Afrobarometer, a cross-national 
representative survey of political and social values conducted in 1999-2001 in 
twelve nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from Botswana to Zimbabwe1. 
This comparative framework has the advantage of including many countries 
from one continent, sharing similar rural economies, cultural traditions, colonial 
histories, and social structures, yet with widely differing degrees of ethno-
linguistic and ethno-racial fractionalisation, types of party systems, and levels of 
democracy. The research design uses binary logistic regression analysis with 
                                                 
1 For more details see www.afrobarometer.org. We would like to thank the core partners, the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana, 
and the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University, as well as all the 
national partners and collaborators who made this survey possible, in particular the work of 
Michael Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi. 
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hierarchical block-wise entry, using both pooled and national samples, with 
identification with the governing party (coded as a dummy) as the dependent 
variable. The first models examine the direct effects of ethno-linguistic and 
racial cleavages upon partisan attachments, without any controls. The second 
models add controls for other standard social characteristics associated with 
party identification in many previous studies, including age, gender, 
urbanisation, class, education and also ‘lived poverty’ as an indicator of severe 
economic deprivation. The third model then adds blocks of variables measuring 
political attitudes, including retrospective evaluations of the government’s 
policy performance, economic evaluations, the legislature’s performance, and 
left-right economic ideology. 
 
The study establishes three main findings:  (i) First we confirm that, even with 
social and attitudinal controls, ethno-linguistic cleavages are a significant 
predictor of support for the governing party in most, although not all, the 
African societies under comparison, as expected.  (ii) Yet at the same time the 
strength of this association varies cross-nationally, with the linkages strongest in 
societies fragmented by many languages, such as Nigeria and South Africa, 
while remaining weakest in countries where ethno-linguistic cleavages are more 
homogeneous, including Lesotho and Botswana. We need to qualify theoretical 
claims by Horowitz (1985), as well as widespread popular perceptions that 
ethno-linguistic cleavages inevitably determine party politics across all African 
societies. Further studies need to examine important variations within the 
continent and establish the reasons for these differences. (iii) Moreover 
structural explanations based on ethnicity are limited: evaluations of the policy 
performance of the party in government also shaped patterns of support for the 
governing party in many countries, even with prior social controls. The 
conclusion summarises the results and considers their broader implications for 
understanding the role of ethnic cleavages in elections within plural societies. 
 
 
Theories of Voting Behaviour 
 
The classic structural theory of voting behaviour developed during 1960s by 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) emphasised that social 
identities formed the basic building blocks of party support in Western Europe. 
For Lipset and Rokkan, European nation-states were stamped by social divisions 
established decades earlier. They highlighted the regional cleavages of centre-
periphery, the class inequalities of workers-owners, and sectarian cleavages over 
church and state that split Christendom between Catholics and Protestants. 
These traditional cleavages were thought powerful in Western Europe for 
several reasons. First, they reflected major ideological fissions in party politics. 
Social class mirrored the basic schism between the left, favouring a strong role 
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for the state through egalitarian welfare policies, fiscal redistribution, and 
interventionist economic management, and the right preferring a more limited 
role for government and laissez-faire market economics. The religious division 
reflected conservative and liberal moral debates, such as those surrounding the 
role of women, marriage and the family. Differences between core and 
periphery concerned how far the nation-state should be centralised or how far 
power should be devolved downwards to the regions. Lipset and Rokkan 
theorised that organisational linkages arose when the mass franchise was 
expanded to most citizens and they gradually strengthened over the years, as 
party systems ‘froze’ in Western Europe from around the 1920s until at least the 
mid-1960s, with stable patterns of party competition revolving around the 
salient primary cleavages dividing each society, as exemplified by the role of 
class in Britain (Butler and Stokes, 1974), religion in France (Lewis-Back and 
Skalaban, 1992), and language in Belgium (Mughan, 1983). 
 
The structural theory provided by Lipset and Rokkan became widely influential 
as the established orthodoxy in understanding voting behaviour and party 
competition in Western Europe, as well as in many other established 
democracies such as Australia and Canada (Alford, 1967; Rose, 1974). 
Nevertheless these accounts came under increasing challenge from the mid-
1960s onwards as newer minor parties started to gain electoral momentum and a 
foothold of parliamentary representation (Rose and Urwin, 1970; Dalder and 
Mair, 1985; Pederson, 1979). This led many observers to suggest that the 
process of societal modernisation was eroding the ‘traditional’ social identities 
of class and religion that had predicted the mass basis of party support in 
established democracies during earlier decades (Crewe, Alt and Sarlvik, 1977; 
Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976; Crewe and Denver, 1985; Franklin et al, 1992; 
Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; Evans, 1999; Manza and Brooks, 1999; Clark 
and Lipset, 2001). If class and religion no longer anchored voters to parties in 
post-industrial societies, this promised to have significant consequences for 
patterns of growing volatility in electoral behaviour and in party competition, 
opening the door for more split-ticket voting across different levels, the 
occasional sudden rise of protest parties, as well as more vote-switching within 
and across the left-right blocks of party families, and the growing influence of 
short-term events, party strategy, candidates and leaders, and media coverage in 
determining the outcome of election campaigns. 
 
Can the structural theory be extended to provide insights into party support and 
voting behaviour in traditional agrarian societies? These are characterised by 
subsistence livelihoods largely based on farming, fishing, extraction and 
unskilled work, with low levels of literacy and education, predominately 
agrarian populations, minimum standards of living, and restricted social and 
geographic mobility. Citizens in agrarian societies, particularly those in Sub-
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Saharan Africa, are commonly believed to be strongly rooted to local 
communities through primary ties of ‘blood and belonging’, including those of 
kinship, family, ethnicity and religion, as well as long-standing cultural bonds 
(Salih and Markakis, 1998, Palmberg, 1999; Bekker, Dodds and Khosa, 2001; 
Daddieh and Fair, 2002). Structural theories suggest that within this context, in 
electoral  democracies, the basic cleavages within each society should provide 
cues linking voters to parties representing each major social sector, whether 
divisions of ethnicity, region, class, or religion. 
 
Donald Horowitz (1985, 1991, 1993) offers one of the most influential theories 
about the relationship between ethnicity, party systems, and voting behaviour in 
developing societies. For Horowitz, ethnicity exerts a strong direct impact on 
electoral behaviour in ethnically-segmented societies, through generating a long-
term psychological sense of party loyalty anchoring citizens to parties, where 
casting a vote becomes an expression of group identity. By implications, other 
social divisions become subsumed as secondary to ethnicity. Horowitz defines 
ethnic parties as those that derive their support from an identifiable ethnic group 
and serve the interests of that group. ‘To be an ethnic party, a party does not 
have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members. It is 
how that party’s support is distributed, not how the ethnic group’s support is 
distributed, that is decisive.’ (Horowitz, 1985:293). Horowitz quotes the 
examples of Guyana, Trinidad, and Ghana, where surveys during the 1960s 
found that parties often received 80-90 percent of their votes from one ethnic 
group. Those voters who crossed ethnic-party lines were subject, not just to the 
usual group pressures, but also to actual intimidation and even physical 
violence. Where ethnic parties predominate, Horowitz suggests that an election 
essentially becomes an ‘ethnic census’.  Party systems are defined as ethnic if all 
parties are ethnically based, as exemplified for Horowitz in the mid-1980s by 
the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Chad, Benin, Kenya, and Nigeria. Such party systems are 
prone to conflict, exacerbating existing ethnic divisions, Horowitz argues, 
because holding the reins of power in state office is often seen as a zero-sum 
game, rather than a process of accommodation. Where party systems in Africa 
are divided by more than one predominant issue cleavage, for example over 
issues of economic redistribution, then Horowitz suggests that the system can 
become multiethnic or non-ethnic, although he regards such cases as relatively 
rare. Unlike other social cues, Horowitz regards ethnicity as a particular problem 
for the usual process of bargaining and compromise that characterise normal 
politics in representative democracies, because he sees ethnicity as ascriptive, 
and therefore more segmented, pillarised and rigid than social identities which 
are more flexible and fluid, or even self-selected, such as those based on class or 
shared ideological beliefs. In the distinction drawn by Norris (2003), ethnic 
parties are regarded in this theory as essentially ‘bonding’ not ‘bridging’ types. 
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Yet as societies develop further, theories of partisan de-alignment suggest that 
the economic shift in the means of production - from agriculture towards heavy 
industry and then the service economy - erodes traditional social identities. 
 
Theories suggest that higher levels of literacy, education, geographic mobility, 
and access to the news media, associated with human development and societal 
modernisation, lay the social foundations for greater partisan de-alignment and 
issue voting (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; Crewe and Denver, 1985; 
Norris, 2003). Better-educated and more cognitively sophisticated citizens, it is 
argued, have less need to rely upon the traditional social cues of ethnicity in 
electoral choices. The mass media allow citizens to compare a range of parties, 
leaders, and public policy issues, potentially exposing them to many dissonant 
values beyond those shared with family and neighbours in their local 
community. In Africa, geographic mobility and urbanisation generate 
crosscutting cleavages based on location, occupation and communication, 
weakening linkages with local communities, extended family networks, and 
tribal groups. In this context, issue voting based on retrospective evaluations of 
the performance of the governing parties, the role of party leaders, and the 
prospective policy platforms of offered by each party, could all be expected to 
become a more important component of voting decisions. If the structural thesis 
is correct, then the strength of cleavage and issue politics can be expected to 
vary systematically among nations at different levels of development. In 
particular, where free and fair democratic elections are held in Africa, traditional 
ethnic identities based on language, region, tribe, or religion are expected to 
exert a strong influence on party support and voting behaviour. But where 
societies are experiencing the process of human development these traditional 
cues are expected gradually to weaken, and ‘bonding’ parties will be displaced 
by ‘bridging’ parties that appeal to multiple overlapping social groups (Norris, 
2003). 
 
What evidence would allow us to test these important claims?  The strength of 
linkages between ethnicity and party voting has been examined in African 
societies by qualitative examination of particular election campaigns, and by 
comparing aggregate election results at district level (see, for example, Ojo, 
1981; Reynolds, 1994; Christopher, 1996; Ake, 1996; Eldridge and Seekings, 
1996; Takougang, 1996; Mozaffar, 1997, 1998; Burnell, 2002). Research has 
also focused upon how far plurality, majoritarian, or proportional electoral 
arrangements can best accommodate ethnic parties (Rabushka and Shepsle, 
1972; Lijphart, 1978, 1994, 1999; Barkan, 1998; Reynolds and Reilly, 1997; 
Sisk and Reynolds, 1998; Reilly and Reynolds, 1998; Scarritt, McMillan and 
Mozaffar, 2001), as well as upon longitudinal trends in ethnic conflict in Africa 
and around the world (Gurr, 1993, 2000; Saideman et a,l 2002). Horowitz 
(1985: 321) describes patterns of ethnic support in some early voting surveys 
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conducted during the 1960s in Guyana and Trinidad, as well as a scattering of 
secondary studies in the literature, although without utilising multivariate 
statistics controlling for factors other than ethnicity. These surveys are also very 
dated, given the transformation of the continent in recent years and powerful 
cycles of democratisation (Gibson, 2002). So far, however, little systematic 
cross-national survey evidence has been available to analyse and explore the 
underlying reasons for party support based on representative samples of the 
general electorate covering a wide range of African societies, with the notable 
exception of South Africa (Mattes 1999; Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999; 
Mattes and Piombo, 2001).  Comparative surveys of many countries and 
multivariate analysis are both essential to establish the relative influence of 
ethnicity today when compared with other structural and attitudinal factors 
potentially shaping electoral behaviour and party support. 
 
 
Comparative Framework, Measures and 
Hypotheses 
 
Selection of Cases 
 
To examine this issue we can turn to analyse the impact of ethno-linguistic and 
ethno racial characteristics on support for the governing party in a dozen African 
states, based on the first wave of the Afrobarometer 1999-2001.  The 
comparative framework used in this study provides the advantages of the 
‘maximum similarity’ strategy (Landman, 2000), which compares countries 
sharing similar cultural traditions within one world region while varying in their 
social structure and party systems in important ways. The cases under 
comparison, shown in Figure 1, range from newer democracies such as 
Botswana, characterised by effective multiparty competition, political stability, 
and an outstanding record on human rights, through systems struggling in the 
transition to stable democracy, to corrupt presidential dictatorships with 
predominant one-party states, rigged elections, and weak opposition movements, 
exemplified by Mugabe’s Zimbabwe (Bratton and van der Walle, 1997; Laakso, 
2002; Taylor, 2002). Levels of ethnic fractionalisation also vary: some societies 
such as Botswana contain relatively homogeneous populations while others are 
divided by multiple divisions of language, religion, and/or region, exemplified 
by increasing religious tensions, communal violence, and separatist conflict 
evident within Nigeria. The party systems in these nations also differ in their 
degree of political institutionalisation, meaning the regularity of party 
competition, how far parties have roots in society, how far winning parties 
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Some of the basic features of the dozen countries in the Afrobarometer survey 
can be compared using the socio-economic and political indicators illustrated in 
Tables 1 and 2.  Over 258 million people live in the countries under comparison, 
representing about one third of all Sub-Saharan Africans. The geographic 
distribution of countries covers mainly southern and western Africa; excluding 
areas north of the Sahara (see Figure 1). All are former British colonies with the 
exceptions of Mali (France) and Namibia (granted independence in 1990 from 
South Africa). The countries vary systematically in their level of democratic 
consolidation and party institutionalisation, which has the advantage of allowing 
us to monitor African attitudes and behaviour under very different political 
contexts. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are currently classified by 
Freedom House’s Gastil index as newer multiparty democracies, characterised 
by extensive political rights and civil liberties2. All the African societies under 
comparison are defined by the UNDP as relatively impoverished, with an 
average per capita income of around $1000 per annum, but it is notable that the 
most democratic countries in the survey have a per capita GNP about ten times 
higher than the other nations. Both South Africa and Namibia have a 
proportional representation electoral system for national parliaments yet they 
also continue to have one-party predominant systems, facing a fragmented and 
weak opposition (Giliomee, 1998; Lanegran, 2001). Another seven of the 
countries under comparison can be classified according to Freedom House as 
‘semi-democratic’, with more limited political rights and civil liberties3. Some 
of these have a chequered history of interrupted electoral democracy since the 
era of decolonisation, including Nigeria (Koehn, 1989), while others such as 
Mali has held more open and competitive multiparty elections only during the 
last decade (Gibson, 2002; Ndegwa, 2001). Lastly two societies, Zimbabwe and 
Uganda, currently have the greatest restrictions on democracy. Uganda has 
introduced several Western-style reforms in restructuring the economy, as well 
as strengthening human rights, but nevertheless the government prevents 
multiparty elections. 
 
More details of party competition in recent elections held in these countries are 
available from Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999). 
 
                                                 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Afrobarometer Survey 
 
The survey, with the first wave conducted in a dozen societies from 1999 to 
2001, was carried out with at least 1200 respondents of voting age drawn from 
each nation, including double this sample size in South Africa, Nigeria and 
Tanzania, producing a total random sample of 21,531 respondents. Both within 
country and country weights were used so that each country sample size was 
equal in the pooled data. The surveys used a standard multi-stage probability 




Measures of Ethno-Linguistic and Racial Cleavages 
 
Ethnic identities are complex phenomena and understood in this study as social 
constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on national, 
cultural-linguistic, racial, or religious backgrounds (Anderson, 1996; Billig, 
1995; Gellner, 1983; Brown et al, 1997; Taras and Ganguly, 1998). They 
provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their 
meaning for the actors, representing ties of blood, soil, faith, and community. 
No single demographic category can define ethnic identities in every society; 
ethno-religious cleavages are believed to be important in some, such as conflict 
within Nigeria between the Christian south and Moslem north, while tribal clans 
located in particular regions provide close kinship and family ties in others, and 
ethno-linguistic divisions play the more important role in still others, such as 
South Africa. In the literature there is considerable debate about the nature of 
ethnic identities, and whether these should be regarded as largely innate, 
ascribed and unchangeable, or alternatively as socially learnt, acquired, and 
plastic, or possibly as some mix between these alternative poles (Anderson, 
1996). Without wading into this controversy, we assume without further 
argument the social meaning of ethnicity is largely socially-derived, and that the 
political relevance of these identities can be exacerbated or mitigated by 
political parties depending upon whether they emphasise ‘bridging’ or ‘bonding’ 
appeals (Norris, 2003). 
 
This study is limited in certain important ways. First, we only examine the 
impact of language and race for ethnic identity, leaving aside alternative 
important types of ethnic identities, including region and religion, for further 
research. We acknowledge that other factors might well play an important role 
in ethnic identities but their analysis requires a different approach, beyond the 
                                                 
4 For more methodological details about sampling and fieldwork procedures and the schedule 
see www.afrobarometer.org. 
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scope of this study, focused on the provincial or regional-level comparisons. For 
example, in Rwanda, Kinyarwanda is the universal official vernacular language, 
yet this did not prevent deep-rooted conflict between majority Hutu and 
minority Tutsi. Second, we focus upon analysing support for the party in 
government, as the most important for the working of the political system, 
without examining support for all other parties. It could well be that minor 
parties serve particular ethnic communities, but in some cases we are limited by 
sample size, and this will also be the subject of future inquiry. This study is 
therefore restricted to analysing only some important aspects of ethnic cleavages 
in African party politics, as the first approach to understanding these issues, but 
we recognise that it is far from the complete story. 
 
Linguistic cleavages are widely regarded as important in African societies for 
ethnic identities, and language represents one of the indicators of ethnic 
fractionalisation that has been most widely used in the literature (Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova 1994; Neto and Cox 1997; Alessina et al. 2002)5. In this study we 
assume that the ethno-linguistic identities under comparison are acquired 
through the socialisation process in early childhood, based on the primary 
language spoken at home, school, and within the local community. Obviously 
multilingual and bi-lingual households, and the acquisition of languages through 
schooling, may dilute or even transform linguistic identities, for example among 
émigrés. The distribution of ethno-linguistic cleavages, shown in Table 3, is 
measured in each country by the language spoken in the home. We exclude 
minor groups where languages are spoken by less than 2% of respondents and 
any reliable analysis is limited by the size of the sample. Largely homogeneous 
societies are exemplified by the ubiquitous use of Sesotho in Lesotho and of 
Setswana in Botswana, where almost everyone shares the same language. By 
contrast considerable linguistic fractionalisation is evident in Nigeria, Uganda, 
Zambia, and South Africa, where seven or more languages are spoken. The size 
of each group is expected to be important for patterns of competition in the party 
system, particularly how far there is one predominant language group, two 
equally-balanced groups, moderate linguistic fractionalisation (with 3-5 main 
languages), or extreme linguistic fractionalisation (with more than 5 linguistic 
                                                 
5 The data most frequently used in the literature to gauge ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
was compiled in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s on the basis of primary country sources, 
and published in the Atlas Narodov Mira in 1964. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
variable (often referred to as ELF) was computed as one minus the Herfinndahl index of 
ethno-linguistic group shares, representing the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belonged to different groups. ELF was used, among many 
others, by Mauro (1995), and by Easterly and Levine (1997). For a discussion see Alesina et 
al. 2002. ELF is summarized for the countries under comparison in the last column in Table 
3. 
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groups). The ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index in Table 3 summarises the 
degree of heterogeneity, ranging from .026 in Lesotho to .856 in Uganda. 
 
Alternatively for comparison we also analyse racial ethnic identities, based on 
the physical characteristics of skin colour, dividing the populations into ‘black’ 
and ‘others’. We assume that racial characteristics are primarily the product of 
biological inheritance, although the meaning, interpretation, and relevance of 
physical characteristics, and how they lead towards group identities, are also 
socially constructed. In all the countries under comparison, 96% of respondents 
were classified as black, another 2% were white, and the remainder were 
categorised as ‘coloured’ or ‘Asian’. In some nations, such as Ghana, Tanzania 
and Uganda, 100% of respondents were defined as ‘black’, limiting our ability 
to examine other more subtle types of racial characteristics, such as skin colour, 
height, or physical features, which may well differentiate locally within this 
group. While many other ethnic characteristics may well overlap with language 
and race, requiring further research into the role of religion, shared histories, 
cultural ties, and regional locations, this study is restricted to the analysis of 
ethno-linguistic and ethno-racial cleavages at national-level. 
 
 
Measures of Partisan Identification 
 
The measure of partisan identification was gauged by the question: ‘Do you 
usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?’ (If ‘yes’) 
‘Which party is that?’ For the dependent variable, patterns of partisanship were 
dichotomised into identification with the party in government or not. As shown 
in Table 4, the largest parties ranged from the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy in Zambia (86% support) and the National Resistance Movement in 
Uganda (82%), where other Ugandan parties cannot legally contest elections, to 
the more moderate lead over the opposition enjoyed by the Botswana 
Democratic Party (59%) and the United Democratic Congress in Ghana (57%). 
Support in some party systems such as Lesotho and Botswana was divided 
between two major and one minor party, while in others, including South Africa, 
support was highly fragmented across multiple contestants. In this study, we 
make no assumptions about the psychological nature of partisan identification 
nor its longevity but rather use it, in the absence of voting choice, as an indirect 
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Analysis of Results 
 
To examine the basis of party identification, our research design employs 
multivariate modelling using binary logistic regression analysis with block-wise 
entry. The models are first applied to the pooled sample and then to each nation. 
The dependent variable is partisan identification, measured by the attachment to 
the main party in government. The first model examines the direct effects of 
belonging to the largest ethno-linguistic group and to racial characteristics 
(black v. all other) upon partisan attachments without any controls. The second 
model then adds controls for other standard social characteristics that studies 
have commonly found to influence patterns of partisanship, including age (in 
years), gender (male), urbanisation (rural residency), social class (middle), and 
education (a four-category scale)6. Given the existence of extreme social 
deprivation in Africa we also include a measure of ‘lived poverty’, indicating 
reported lack of health care, food, and water at home. The final model then 
examines the indirect effect of ethno-linguistic cleavages after we add blocks of 
variables measuring political attitudes. 
 
Factor analysis (with details not reported here) was used for the construction of 
the attitudinal scales. The models included a scale measuring retrospective 
evaluations of the government’s performance on six issues such as health care, 
education and employment, as well as evaluations of the performance of the 
legislature. We monitored attitudes towards left-right ideology, with a 28-point 
scale measured by summing agreement with a series of seven items gauging 
support for the free market economy versus the state, such as ‘The private sector 
should build houses’, ‘The private sector should fight crime’, and ‘The private 
sector should provide schools’. The economic satisfaction scale was constructed 
from three items concerning satisfaction with the present state of the national 
economy, satisfaction with the national economy during the past year, and 
expectations that the national economy would improve during the next year. Full 
details of the questions and coding are given below Table 5. It should be noted 
that in these models we are essentially concerned with testing the strength and 
significance of the relationship between the independent variables and party 
identification, not the direction. The structural theory makes no predictions 
about the positive or negative sign of the coefficients for social structure, which 
can be expected to vary in different countries depending upon the nature of the 
governing party and the type of campaign appeals that they make when seeking 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that we also explored the impact of including measures of access to the 
mass media and of political knowledge, but since these were highly inter-correlated with 
education these variables were eventually dropped from the models on the grounds of 
parsimony. 
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support from the electorate, for example whether they seek to build support 
among urban or rural constituents, or among younger or older voters. 
 
The baseline models presented in Table 5 summarise the results for the pooled 
pan-African sample. There are three main findings evident from the analysis. 
First, ethnicity does matter for partisan identification in African societies, as 
many commonly claim. The results in Model 1 confirm that both language and 
race are significant predictors of support for the governing party, although these 
two factors alone fail to explain a great deal of variance in party attachments, as 
shown by the low R2. Model 2 adds a variety of social controls to see whether 
this reduces the power of ethnicity. The results demonstrate that language and 
race remain significant, so that their impact cannot be interpreted as simply the 
by-product of other structural cleavages in society. Moreover all the standard 
structural factors that are most commonly used to explain partisan identification 
in many other countries are also significant in African societies, with the 
governing parties getting slightly stronger support among men, older citizens, 
the less educated, rural populations, and the poorer classes. The overall fit of the 
model strengthens slightly although it remains modest. Model 3 adds the 
attitudinal indicators and the evaluations of the government’s policy record. 
Approval of the performances of the legislature, economic satisfaction, and left-
right ideology are, as expected, strongly related to support for the governing 
party. Even after the addition of all the other social background and attitudinal 
measures, the measures of ethno-linguistic and racial characteristics remain 
strongly significant predictors of support for the governing party, despite our 
most rigorous tests.  
 
Are similar patterns evident if the sample is broken down by country? Table 6 
explores this by replicating Model 3 in each nation. Here the results are more 
complex to interpret, as both the significance and the direction of the beta 
coefficients vary from one country to another. In part, as mentioned earlier, this 
can be explained by the particular characteristics of the governing party and the 
type of linkages they develop with the electorate through their campaign 
appeals. Nevertheless if we focus upon the significant coefficients then the 
overall picture becomes clearer. The second major findings is that, even with the 
range of social and attitudinal controls, belonging to the largest ethno-linguistic 
group is a significant predictor of attachment to the governing party in most, but 
not all, of the African nations under comparison. Exceptions are found in two of 
the most homogeneous linguistic societies, Lesotho and Botswana. Language 
also fails to prove significant in Mali and Tanzania, although these are more 
linguistically fragmented. Moreover in some states where there is a significant 
relationship the linkage is positive, including in Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria and 
Zambia, indicating that the predominant linguistic group in strongly associated 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda. The relationship between language and party 
support also proves strongest in Namibia and Nigeria, indicating deep ethno-
linguistic political cleavages in these states. 
 
Yet the explanatory power of ethnicity remains limited, since approval of the 
government’s policy performance on the provision of basic services such as 
health care, education and employment is also significantly related to 
identification with the governing party. This pattern is evident in all nations 
except for Nigeria and Uganda. Approval of the performance of the legislature 
was also significantly associated with party identification in many nations. 
Therefore although structural explanations receive further confirmation from the 
analysis, explaining party support in African nations in a similar way to 
established democracies, nevertheless the role of ethnicity should not be 
exaggerated. A more rational calculation of how well the government and the 
legislature perform is also part of the reason for patterns of support for the 
governing party, beyond any traditional group loyalties. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Structural theories have long dominated explanations of party support and 
voting behaviour in established democracies. If these accounts are extended to 
elections in African societies they suggest that ethnic identities can be expected 
to strongly orient citizens towards the party system by providing a simple, low-
cost guide to voting decisions, enabling information shortcuts that allowed 
people to decide which politicians and parties to support over successive 
contests. These cognitive shortcuts are predicted to be particularly useful for the 
least sophisticated citizens, especially those with minimal literacy and 
schooling, and with limited access to independent political information available 
from the mass media. These party attachments are predicted to gradually weaken 
and erode through socioeconomic development, particularly rising levels of 
education and cognitive-skills that can help to master understanding of the 
complexities of public affairs and the policymaking process. 
 
The results in the analysis of systematic survey evidence serve to confirm the 
common assumption that ethnic-linguistic cleavages do indeed structure party 
identification in many, although not all, of the African societies under 
comparison. In the national models, ethnicity remained significant in eight out 
of twelve countries. Yet ethnicity was not necessarily the primary cleavage as 
other structural factors are also important for partisanship, if less consistent 
across all societies under comparison, whether the rural-urban cleavage evident 
dividing cities, towns and villages in Mali, Namibia and Tanzania, the role of 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































education in Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Moreover, far from support being 
an automatic expression of group loyalties, judgments contingent upon how well 
the government delivers services to its citizens were also related to their patterns 
of party support in most countries. 
 
Further analysis is required to explore the role of ethnicity in African electoral 
politics in far greater depth, and subsequent research will analyse a range of 
alternative indicators of ethnic identity including religious faiths, adherence to 
shared histories and customs, and tribal identities within particular regional 
communities. Ethnicity is a complex phenomenon and the impact of single 
indicators can be expected to vary among different societies. The geographic 
distribution of ethnic identities will also be explored at sub-national level, since 
this is critical to political representation and the role of ethnic parties, especially 
in majoritarian electoral systems. Moreover we also need to test the impact of 
ethnicity on many other factors beyond party support, including on voting 
choice and electoral turnout, as well as on broader attitudes towards a broad 
range of social and political values, such as support for democracy and 
satisfaction with the workings of the political system. Although the first round 
of the Afrobarometer covers a wide range of countries on the continent, 
subsequent surveys will expand coverage to other African states, facilitating 
broader generalisations, such as among a range of Muslim and non-Muslim 
societies, as well as among countries with different colonial histories and 
transitions since independence. Nevertheless the results in this analysis serve to 
confirm that far from any ‘African exceptionalism’, often stressed by area 
specialists and students of ethnic conflict, structural and attitudinal factors 
explaining partisan identification in Africa reflect those established in many 
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The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy In Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 
 
